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Fitzgerald v. Mobile Billboards, L.L.C., 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 30 (May 3, 2018)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: MOTION TO DISMISS; CIVIL LAW: DEFAMATION,
CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE
Summary
The Court found that the absolute privilege provided in common law that protects
defamatory statements made during the course of quasi-judicial proceeding does not apply to
workers’ compensation proceedings governed by the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA).
There, a conditional privilege applies, and allegedly defamatory statements are protected so long
as the speaker made the statements without malicious intent.
Background
Appellant Sean Fitzgerald worked at Mobile Billboards, owned by Vincent Bartello
(collectively, Respondents) for a brief amount of time before sustaining a work-related injury.
Following the injury, Appellant applied for workers’ compensation with the company’s insurance
company. The Respondents, in reference to the claim, told the insurance company that they were
concerned with Appellant’s use of prescription pain medication. More specifically, that the
Appellant “was attempting to obtain more and different prescription painkillers after his industrial
injury, that multiple prescription painkillers, and prescriptions for additional painkillers were
found” in Appellant’s belongings. The insurance company provided those statements to Appellant
and also to his workers’ compensation doctor. Subsequently, Appellant filed a claim for
defamation against Respondents alleging that their statements were false and caused harm to his
reputation. The district court dismissed Appellant’s case after granting Respondents’ NRCP
12(b)(5)2 motion to dismiss. That court found the statements were immune under absolute
privilege. Thereafter, Appellant appealed.
Discussion
Absolute privilege
Appellant challenged the district court’s findings that the Respondents’ statements to the
insurance company were protected by an absolute common law privilege. Appellant also
challenged the district court’s failure to consider the conditional privilege provided under NRS
616D.020.3 The Court agreed.
In Nevada, there is a common law absolute privilege that protects defamatory statements
made during the course of judicial proceedings.4 This privilege extends to “quasi-judicial
proceeding before executive officers, boards, and commissions.”5 Additionally, this privilege
completely bars defamation claims where: (1) the proceeding was contemplated in good faith and
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N.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) (2016).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 616D.020 (2017); see NEV. REV. STAT § 616D.300 (2017).
Jacobs v. Adelson, 130 Nev. 408, 412, 325 P.3d 1282, 1285 (Nev. 2014).
Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56, 61, 657 P.2d 101, 104 (Nev. 1983).

under serious consideration and (2) the statements were related to the investigation.6 The absolute
privilege further applies to those claims where the defamatory statements were made with
malicious intent.
However, this common law rule does not apply where it conflicts with a statute. Workers’
compensation claims are governed by the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA).7 The NIIA
conditionally precludes liability in a defamation suit.8 The alleged defamer must not have made
the statement with malicious intent to be protected from civil liability. Here, there is a conflict
between the common law privilege and statutory privilege because the common law privilege is
absolute, and the statutory privilege is conditional. Consequently, the district court erred by
concluding the respondents’ statements were absolutely privileged in granting the motion to
dismiss as a matter of law.
Application of NRS 616D.020
It is a question of law whether a conditional privilege exists. If a conditional privilege
exists, a defamation claim will be “presented to a jury only if there is sufficient evidence for a jury
to reasonably infer” that a statement was made with malicious intent.9 While the limited record
suggested that the Respondents’ statements would be immune from civil liability because they
were made were made in connection with Appellant’s workers’ compensation claim, the
Respondents must have also made their statements without malicious intent to be immune.
Because it not known if the Respondents presented a defense under NRS 616D.020 and the case
is at the NRCP 12(b)(5) stage, the Court declined to address whether a conditional privilege applied
in this case given that it was its first time on appeal.10
Conclusion
The Court reversed the district court’s order to dismiss and remanded the matter back to
the district court. The Court found that the district court erred in granting the Respondents’ NRCP
12(b)(5) motion to dismiss solely based on findings that the statements were immune under
absolute privilege.
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